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Over the course of the twentieth century, and lamentably persisting into the twenty-first, 
genocide has continued to decimate civilian populations around the globe. International response 
to these atrocities has- more often than not- been too little, too late. Yet, in the aftermath of 
Armenia, Cambodia, Kurdistan, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, the international community has 
repeatedly echoed the chorus “Never again”. This promise is indelibly tied to the most well-
researched, well-documented, and largest genocides of the twentieth century: the Holocaust. The 
preeminence of the Holocaust in popular conscience gives it particular salience when addressing 
other cases of genocide, as evidenced in the continual use of the slogan “Never again”.  
To establish a more comprehensive understanding of how politicians respond to cases of 
genocide and to better understand how the international community –the United States not 
withstanding- has continually failed to live up to their promise of “Never again”, I will seek to 
answer the question: when and how are references to the Holocaust made by political officials 
and to what end are they invoked? I propose to do this by analyzing principally political speeches 
and official addresses made regarding the Rwandan genocide and the current crisis taking place 
in Darfur, and looking briefly at the case of Kosovo. First, I will show how the Holocaust can be 
used in political rhetoric, highlighting these methods by employing comparisons with news 
stories, opinion writers, and speeches by public activists. Then, I will focus on particular cases in 
official political addresses where Holocaust references are and are not employed, and explain 
 
Michelle Greco 
Analysis of Holocaust References in Political Rhetoric 
J400 
2007 Burgess Award  
 
2 
why this is the case. By the end of this paper, I expect it will be clear that references to the 
Holocaust can be employed in various guises, but are only used in political rhetoric when at least 
one of two “safety factors” is present.  
Emotive Use of the Holocaust 
 “The terminology of the Holocaust has entered into the contemporary lexicon and it has 
come to be used by advocates of many causes for a multitude of political and cultural purposes.”1 
Here, Hasia Diner states succinctly that the Holocaust is now part of the popular culture, as the 
majority of the populace has some understanding of the Holocaust. Thus, the Holocaust- 
awareness of which has become almost common knowledge- is prime material for use in the 
public arena, where media outlets and public speakers seek to reach an audience typically 
composed of mixed socio-economic status and varied educational backgrounds. The Holocaust, 
then, provides a synthesizing thread through which a speaker may connect to these audience 
members- regardless their individual backgrounds.  This fact- that the Holocaust is a topic to 
which many can relate- is the principle upon which this inquiry is based.  
While the accuracy of Diner’s statement may seem self-evident, one cannot simply dive 
into an analysis of when politicians choose to employ Holocaust references and when they 
choose not to do so. In order to understand when and why the Holocaust is used in political 
rhetoric, it is first essential to examine how it is used- that is, to identify the various ways in 
which speakers can employ the Holocaust in their addresses.  Upon understanding these methods 
and their affect on the audience’s perception of the speaker’s message, speakers’ motivations and 
patterns for employing the Holocaust will become dramatically clearer. Likewise, the importance 
                                               
1 Diner, Hasia. (2006). “Before ‘the Holocaust’: American Jews Confront Catastrophe, 1945-1962.”  
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of the role of “safety factors”- factors present in a situation which act as an obstacle to action- 
will become more meaningful.  
Historian Peter Novick identifies the Holocaust as an “emblematic atrocity.”2 The weight 
of imagery and connotation conjured by mere inference to the Holocaust constitutes its 
“emblematic” status. Commanding such a powerful response from the social schema of an 
audience, makes references to the Holocaust a useful tool for numerous speakers. This may be 
employed in a variety of ways. In an attempt to “start at the beginning”, let us first examine use 
of the Holocaust at the beginning of addresses.  
Structural Use 
Use of the Holocaust in the opening lines of a speech immediately sets the tone of the 
address. By using this method, the context in which the audience receives, interprets, and 
evaluates the speaker’s message is established from the outset. For example, in an address 
delivered by U. S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues David J. Scheffer, his first 
substantive statement begins, “The legacy of the Holocaust, which includes much unfinished 
business…”3 The body of his speech is concerned mainly with more recent atrocities, 
reparations, and war-crimes trials. However, in opening his speech in reference to the Holocaust, 
he has laid the foundation for linking the Holocaust to his message about his current 
undertakings as a US official. Similarly, Representative Tom Lantos (D-Ca) began an article, 
“After the Holocaust, the world declared that never again would we stand by and let genocide 
take place. And yet…genocide [is] raging unabated in western Sudan.”4 The remainder of the 
piece focuses exclusively on the crisis in Sudan, but as a result of the opening paragraph, the 
                                               
2 Novick, Peter. (1999). The Holocaust in American Life. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. (257) 
3 Scheffer, David J. (1999). “Milosovic, Pinochet, and US: Responding to Crimes Against Humanity.”  
4 Lantos, Rep. Tom. (2005). “Genocide Can’t Be Ignored.”  
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gravity of the Holocaust increases the weight of Lantos’ message on Darfur. Thus, Rep. Lantos is 
able to color the audience’s perception by linking the Holocaust to Darfur. By immediately 
mentioning the Holocaust, he establishes it as a source of comparison, even before introducing 
the main subject.  
Concordantly, closing a speech with reference to the Holocaust can refocus the content of 
the speech through the prism of the Holocaust. This can be done without having made prior 
mention of the Holocaust, in an effort to “pack a punch” and throw the audience a twist that will 
remain long after they leave their seats. However, it may also be used when a reference has 
already been made during the opening lines of the address. For example, in the same address 
mentioned above, Scheffer- after having opened his rather extensive speech by mentioning the 
Holocaust- brings the audience full circle, saying  
“We must make every effort to ensure that the worst crimes of the Twentieth 
Century are not repeated in the Twenty-first. None of us can or will forget the 
Nazi war crimes-arguably the most abominable atrocities of this century. The 
horrors of the Holocaust must serve to reinforce the resolve of this generation of 
Americans to eradicate such heinous crimes…”5 
 By re-introducing the Holocaust at the close of his address, he simultaneously instills the import 
of his speech for the future by tying it to the weight of the past, via the Holocaust. The audience, 
having been primed at the outset with images of the Holocaust can more easily make this 
connection and thus more readily accept his message.  
In addition to Holocaust references opening and closing addresses, the Holocaust can 
function as a structural component of the speech. Here, the Holocaust serves as a more factual, 
contextualizing element in relation to the conflict which is the main topic of the address. It can 
be used to augment the audience’s perception of the given conflict’s severity. Even if a fewer 
                                               
5 Scheffer, David.  
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number of people are involved in a particular incident (i.e. 800,000 in Rwanda; 300,000 in 
Darfur), it can be placed in the larger context of the enormity of the Holocaust, thus inferring 
parallels of impact, severity, immortality, etc. Furthermore, because it is not politically correct to 
state that one life is worth more than another, placing even a small conflict on the same spectrum 
of atrocities as that on which the Holocaust lies, it would be practically impossible to dismiss the 
smaller conflict as “not that bad” without incurring severe political consequences and moral 
criticisms. These two factors combine to force a third result of Holocaust rhetoric: the 
establishment of an urgency in stopping a genocide. This stems both from the stated value of 
human life and thus the desire to save lives (necessitating quick action), as well as having 
established parallels of situations and thus opened the possibility that a small conflict could reach 
the scale of the Holocaust (demanding action to prevent the conflict from escalating to this 
point).  
Moral Evocation 
Hasia Diner explores what she terms “Holocaust consciousness,” and “the magnetic draw 
of the Holocaust in American popular culture well beyond the boundaries of the Jewish 
community.”6 This public mentality fosters a common perception of the Holocaust, its facts, 
effects, and moral obligations.  Thus, the Holocaust evokes a sense of guilt and moral imperative 
for the majority of the American populace; this is the reason that speakers can use it to 
manipulate an audience through structural devices, as mentioned above. The death and 
destruction of the Holocaust has become ingrained in popular conception- present in images of 
loaded boxcars, crematoria, and Auschwitz. With this imagery has also come a sense of common 
responsibility that humanity allowed such atrocities to occur. As such, references to the 
                                               
6 Diner, Hasia. (51) 
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Holocaust can serve as a font of listeners’ feelings of guilt in non-action. Congressman George 
Miller (D- California) most clearly employs this “guilt-trip” stratagem in the following passage:  
During the past genocides of Armenia, the Holocaust, and Rwanda, the world 
community failed to speak up and act with diligence in a timely manner… Now 
we look back at the tens of millions of lost and destroyed lives and ask how this 
happened. Today we have the opportunity to learn from history rather than repeat 
it. Already too much damage has occurred but if we act with diligence now, 
perhaps we can stop this catastrophe that is occurring in Darfur.7 
 
There is a call to popular action based on the assumption that every person shares the 
responsibility to prevent such atrocities. This concept is founded in the belief that failures to stop 
genocide in the past are inexcusable and continue to mar the record of humanity.  
Claims that historical obligation has resulted in present imperatives is embodied by the 
catchphrase “Never Again”. This phrase is popularly identified as the “lesson” of the Holocaust, 
if one could claim to derive such a lesson from such an event. Regardless the appropriateness of 
the nomenclature, politicians, political activists, and teachers alike tout the slogan as the essential 
message imparted to future generations by this horrific event. As one can clearly not turn back 
the clock and save the 11 million lives lost during the genocidal campaign across Europe, 
popular conception identifies the only alternative as preventing its repetition in the future. Thus, 
the phrase has gained wide-spread recognition, and come to invoke the Holocaust without 
requiring any prior mention of the event itself. In many cases, the slogan “Never Again” is used 
to highlight the discrepancy between the promise made over 60 years ago, and the reality of the 
current situation. For example, regarding the genocide in Darfur, Representative Steve Israel 
                                               
7 Miller, Congressman George. 7 March 2006. Press Release: Congressman Miller Takes Struggle in Darfur to 
United Nations.  
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invokes this terminology with his comment, “After the Holocaust, we declared ‘Never Again!’ 
But, how many times can we say ‘Never Again!’?”8   
Because the Holocaust constitutes a dark period in history, it also serves as a point from 
which one may attempt to measure the progress of society in regards both to humanity itself and 
the to international institutions which were developed in the post-World War II era. The 
evaluation of humanity stems from the moral imperative to act (described above) and whether or 
not people do intervene. U.S. Ambassador David Scheffer employs this method in an implicit but 
effective manner. He states,  
The first crimes against humanity [took place] more than 50 years ago… And yet 
today, on the eve of the new millennium when the technological, economic, and 
artistic triumph of mankind brings new meaning to civilization, the mega-crimes 
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and significant war crimes still occur.9  
 
In his statement, Scheffer clearly compares the advances of society (technological innovations 
and economic prosperity) with the repetition of heinous crimes. This type of comparison serves 
to highlight the importance of the discrepancy in society’s development and elicit a sense of guilt 
and motivation to remedy the situation. Compounding this sense of guilt is the threat that 
“History” itself will judge non-action unsympathetically and render a verdict of shame. History 
as a judge is not a stratagem unique to use of the Holocaust. However, it is well-suited to it, as 
Representative Lantos’ words make clear: “[In 1943] We could have bombed the railroad lines 
that were carrying tens of thousands of victims each month to [Auschwitz]. Instead, we bombed 
oil facilities less than five miles away… History will judge us no less harshly if we now 
                                               
8 Israel, Steve, Together We Can Start a Ripple of Change, address: 3 April 2006. 
9 Scheffer, David. Department of State Washington File, Transcript: Scheffer Address on Crimes Against Humanity, 
Milosevic, Pinochet, and US: Responding to Crimes Against Humanity, December 1999. p. 2 
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knowingly stand by as the men, women and children of Darfur suffer and die.”10 The message 
here is clear: any excuse the world may have had in 1943 no longer applies; to repeat this 
noninterference would be unforgivable and the legacy of inhumanity will stain our portrait in 
history for generations. 
The final rhetorical device that can be used to invoke the Holocaust is actually not a 
device but a single word: “genocide”. The term “genocide” has strong ties to the Holocaust. In 
fact, it was first invented by Raphael Lemkin in an attempt to devise a word that would have 
such “lasting association with Hitler’s horrors, it would send shudders down the spines of those 
who heard it.”11 Lemkin, a Polish Jew who immigrated to the United States in 1941, sought to 
use his position outside Europe to motivate international intervention, in part by coining a new 
word which would strike listeners to the core. “It had to chill listeners and invite immediate 
condemnation…His word would do it all. It would be the rare term that carried in it society’s 
revulsion and indignation.”12 Thus, the term was specifically designed to be associated with the 
Holocaust and to elicit emotional responses of horror and moral absolutism. Largely, he 
succeeded: the term genocide still carries with it an inextricable reference to the Holocaust, 
inherent in its meaning. Thus, during this inquiry, use of the term genocide –or avoidance 
thereof- will be equated to reference or avoidance to mention of the Holocaust.  
Safety Factors 
In light of the powerful responses that a mention of the Holocaust can elicit, and the 
variations in which it may be manipulated to educe certain types or degrees of responses by 
audience members, it should come as no surprise that in the carefully calculating world of 
                                               
10 Lantos, Representative Tom.  
11 Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell. (42) 
12 Ibid. 
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politics, use of Holocaust references are made with great care. It should be noted, that in the 
extensive analysis presented above, no example exists in which the Holocaust was portrayed in a 
positive light- that is, where the perpetration of the Holocaust was condoned and Allied 
intervention lamented. In today’s cultural climate, the atrocities of the Holocaust are reviled 
across the board.13 Concordantly, there are no instances in which a speaker has attempted to 
employ the imagery or example of the Holocaust as an argument against intervening in 
genocide. Such use of the Holocaust, in this cultural environment, is simply not possible. As 
such, politicians design, as with all rhetorical devices, to use Holocaust references to their 
advantage. Unless a leader is earnestly seeking to intervene in the conflict, which as Samantha 
Powers points out in her work A Problem from Hell: America in the Age of Genocide is rarely 
the case, s/he can do this only in a certain climate of mitigating circumstances, or what I shall 
call “safety factors.” 
As has already been established, use of Holocaust rhetoric can motivate popular opinion 
towards moral action and intervention in a genocide. A politician, when seeking for whatever 
reasons to avoid such action, will thus predictably steer clear of employing any such 
motivational rhetoric. However, if the politician is incapable of initiating action, as with the 
cases of lower-ranking public officials, and is fairly certain that no such turn of events will occur 
as a result of his individual calls for action, he may “safely” employ Holocaust references for his 
own personal benefit. This inability to propel action on one’s own accounts not only for the bold 
statements of several Congressmen, but - as we will see- for President George W. Bush’s 
statements as well. Additionally, if the party in question will not be held directly responsible for 
                                               
13 A noted acceptation made for extremist groups. However, their mentality is not the focus here, due to their 
marginal status and their negligible impact on politicians.   
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the consequences of active engagement, they too may safely employ the Holocaust in popular 
dialogue. These parties may include lower government officials, interest groups, news 
reporters/journalists, and even celebrity activists. Conversely, the absence of both these “safety 
factors” in the case of President Clinton’s position during the genocide in Rwanda explains not 
only his lack of direct Holocaust references, but even the infamous aversion to using the word 
“genocide”14.   
Holocaust References and the Presence of Safety Factors 
The first safety factor- the power to affect change and take action- and the second- the 
responsibility for the outcome of any such action- are starkly absent in the arenas where one sees 
the most Holocaust references made. These arenas principally include lobbyist groups, celebrity 
activists, and the press- but may also include lower-ranking government officials.  
News stories such as Nick Grimm’s 2005 NPR report “UN Questions Whether World has 
Learned from WWII” unabashedly connect the current crisis in Darfur with the Holocaust, 
juxtaposing testimony from Holocaust survivors with calls to action in current crises. Opinion-
editorials frequently make these comparisons as well.15 For example, Nat Hentoff in his 
Washington Post piece, “Have you thought of Darfur lately?” parallels the world’s silence in the 
face of Darfur to its silence in the face of the Holocaust. However, despite their ability to 
potentially rally popular outrage, these journalists and reporters have no official authority and 
thus are not capable of taking direct action. They are thus free to write on moral authority, while 
bearing no risk or responsibility. Loss of U.S. troops will not be on their head.  
                                               
14 which, as stated above, is tantamount to employing the Holocaust directly. 
15 The primary news venues (such as prime-time news programs and popular print media) tend to follow the 
government’s official line. However, though many might agree or disagree, this assertion is a separate topic of 
inquiry in and of itself.  
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The International Crisis Group, one of many nongovernmental organizations lobbying for 
peace, issues articles and updates on genocidal crises which are replete with Holocaust 
references. Just one among these many stated, “In…Sudan, unspeakable atrocities are being 
committed in the context of civil wars which have taken the lives of approximately six million 
people. The parallels of this modern-day holocaust to 1994's genocide in Rwanda are stark.”16 
Here, the inference that the Holocaust is happening again in Darfur resounds with moral 
imperative and urgency. Not surprisingly, the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum is also 
actively engaged in campaigns against genocide, and does not hesitate to employ the imagery of 
the 1940’s atrocities. Yet, once again, these institutions are not capable of instigating pro-active 
policies, and as such, enjoy the comfort of safety factors.  
In addition to lobbyist groups and news media, activists enjoy the presence of these same 
safety factors. While all activists may choose to employ Holocaust references, celebrity activists 
seem to get the most media attention, and thus reach the largest audience. As a prime example, 
one may turn to George Clooney. In an address to the U.N., Clooney stated:  
In many ways, it's unfair -- but it is never the less true -- that this genocide will be 
on your watch. How you deal with it will be your legacy. Your Rwanda. Your 
Cambodia. Your Auschwitz. We were brought up to believe that the U.N. was 
formed to ensure that The Holocaust could never happen again. We believe in you 
so strongly. We need you so badly. We've come so far. We're one 'yes' away from 
ending this.17 
His address relied on the guilt and impact associated with these references to the Holocaust, as 
an attempt to convey the urgency and imperative to spur the U.N. to act. These references in 
particular employed a number of the emotive strategies discussed above, including the imagery 
of Auschwitz, threat of historical judgment, moral imperatives, and personal responsibility. His 
                                               
16 International Crisis Group. (8 January 2005). “Rwanda’s Lessons Yet to be Learned.” 
17 Clooney, George, Briefing to UN on Darfur. Fox News: Deutsche Presse Agentur/ The Raw Story, 14, September 
2006. 
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entreaty to the U.N., his statement that “We’re one yes away from ending this”18 underscores his 
impotence in this matter; thus, it is clear that the power and ultimate responsibility lies with the 
U.N. Celebrities, however, are not the only activists. Jerry Fowler, a representative for the 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, Darfur activist, and non-celebrity, also employs references to the 
Holocaust. In his recent lecture “From Memory to Action: The Role of Holocaust Remembrance 
in Combating Genocide Today”19 he focused on translating the obligation one has to remember 
the Holocaust to an obligation to act in preventing or intervening in other genocides (focusing 
particularly on Sudan).  
These safety factor principles are also evident in the speeches by Congressmen and other 
government officials cited above, including Representatives Tom Lantos, George Miller, and 
Steve Israel, as well as Ambassador Scheffer. They cannot of their own accord choose to commit 
resources and men to intervene in crisis, nor take any direct individual action on the international 
scale, and as such enjoy greater freedom in their calls for action. They can criticize non-action 
and gain the moral high-ground, without risking their own reputation on the uncertainties 
involved with a pro-active policy.  
These statements are not meant to question the commitment and authenticity of the moral 
convictions these reporters, officials, celebrities, or NGO employees may feel. However, the 
environment in which they work- one characterized by the presence of these safety factors- no 
doubt affects their actions, their strategies, and their choice to employ Holocaust references. For 
groups such as the International Crisis Group, their organization’s purpose is to combat 
genocide, and my comments here are not meant to question the sincerity of that goal. My point is 
                                               
18 Ibid.  
19 Fowler, Jerry. (12 Oct 2006). “From Memory to Action: The Role of Holocaust Remembrance in Combating 
Genocide Today”  
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merely that these safety factors are present, and it is precisely because these actors- reporters, 
activists, etc- operate in an environment so characterized, that they are free to work and feel as 
they do, employing Holocaust rhetoric along the way. To some extent- certainly with the non-
governmental actors- the activists may not even consider the role of these safety factors in their 
decisions. However, the nature of politics is one of extensive calculation and conscious decision-
making. As such, it would be prudent to examine those politicians who are ranked so highly that 
a single misstep could prove disastrous, in whose actions there is likely much planning and 
calculation, and whose decisions can indeed have significant consequence. Thus, let us look to 
President Bush’s remarks regarding the conflict in Darfur, as well as the political environment in 
which he operates.  
 
 
Bush, Darfur, and Safety Factors 
In his September 19, 2006 address to the United Nations General Assembly, President 
George W. Bush implicitly demonstrated the importance of using the term “genocide” and the 
implications thereof. His first statement regarding Darfur was the following: “To the people of 
Darfur: You have suffered unspeakable violence, and my nation has called these atrocities what 
they are – genocide.”20 If one examines the sentence structure, this apparently simple statement 
actually seems to establish the declaration of genocide as an offering to the Darfurians, in 
response to their suffering. The link between the “unspeakable violence” they are experiencing 
and the separate clause “my nation has called these atrocities what they are” creates an aura of 
reciprocating action, legitimizing the response and making it seem not only justified and 
                                               
20 Bush, George W. “President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly.” 19 Sept 2006. (3) 
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appropriate, but indeed the right course of action- the proscribed next step. Implicitly, if the 
United States has taken this “appropriate course of action”, while the United Nations and other 
nations have not, they can be seen as leading the way to resolving the situation. Thus, the United 
States gains the “moral high ground” relative to other nations and international organizations.  
By using the first sentence in the Darfur section of his address to reiterate that the U.S. 
has officially deemed the atrocities taking place a “genocide”, Pres. Bush underscores the weight 
and exclusivity of the term. As his first major point, he sets this act of “calling it straight” as a 
principle step in dealing with the situation in Darfur, and thus establishes the commitment of the 
United States in relieving the suffering. The implications involved with the declaration of 
genocide are, as explained in the previous section, far reaching in both the moral implications as 
well as the actual logistical considerations to be made in stopping genocide. However, Bush is 
free to make these statements because the UN Security Council is highly unlikely to intervene in 
Darfur. Thus, in choosing to work with the United Nations, President Bush can play the moral 
high-card with the American public, without the risk of engaging the United States in a conflict 
under his watch.  
Absence of Safety Factors 
The safety factors present in the cases considered above were not applicable to the 
situation that the Clinton administration faced during the genocide in Rwanda. Clinton, by 
definition of presidential powers, was in a position to intervene in Rwanda. It was completely 
within his ability as President of the United States to send U.S. military troops and jam radio- 
broadcasts (which played an infamous role in urging the perpetrators), among other options. 
Thus, the first safety factor (inability to effect action) is clearly not present. Likewise, Clinton 
would have been held directly responsible for U.S. actions, had he chosen to intervene.  
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The institutional and logistical restraints on Clinton’s actions were not present as they are 
in Bush’s case. For Bush, over-committal of troops abroad, as well as failing international 
standing has made cooperation with the U.N. an advisable strategy and plausible excuse for non-
intervention. Additionally, the lucrative oil economy of Darfur is of key interest to U.N. Security 
Council members China and Russia, complicating the politics and making the decision to defer 
to U.N. authority advisable for reasons that have little to do with the welfare of Darfur. However, 
Clinton did not face these problems; Rwanda’s coffee-based economy did not bear significantly 
on the decision making, and U.S. troops were not in short supply. Yet, after having recently 
suffered the debacle in Somalia, the Clinton administration was wary of intervention in such 
humanitarian crises, and as such had strong incentive to avoid repeating its embarrassments. 
Thus, it should come as little surprise that no Holocaust references can be found in official 
government releases.  
The same aversion that Clinton had to intervention in Rwanda, Bush may have regarding 
Darfur. However, due to the structural environment in which each operated, the rhetoric varied 
widely. While Bush has “called these atrocities what they are—genocide”21, the Clinton 
administration notoriously avoided labeling Rwanda a genocide. One of the most well-known 
instances of this political side-stepping is indubitably State Department spokesperson Christine 
Shelly’s Press Briefing22 of April 20, 1994 in which the definition of genocide and its 
applicability to Rwanda were discussed: 
Q A British aid agency, OXFAM, today described what is happening there as 
genocide. Does the State Department have a comment on that or a view as to 
whether or not what is happening could be genocide?  
                                               
21 Bush, George W. “President Bush Addresses United Nations General Assembly.” 19 Sept 2006. (3) 
22 Department of State Daily Press Breifing. DPC #68. Shelly, Christine. 28, April 1994. 
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MS. SHELLY: As I think you know, the use of the term "genocide" has a very 
precise legal meaning although it's not strictly a legal determination. There are other 
factors in there as well… there are three types of elements that we look at in order 
to make that kind of a determination. One is to look at the types of actions which 
are being undertaken… Certainly, in those elements there are actions which have 
occurred which would fit the first types of those categories. It appears that much of 
this is directed toward particular ethnic groups. Certainly, the types of actions being 
committed and the extent of the killings also would suggest that this type of activity 
is taking place. 
This excerpt exhibits two very important concepts. First, the fact that the British news media had 
labeled the conflict a “genocide” while the United States government still had not relates to the 
press’ freedom to use such language because they have no direct power or responsibility for 
action (safety factors 1 and 2).  Second, Shelly’s refusal to officially use the word “genocide” in 
reference to Rwanda is a “gesture that testified to both Lemkin’s success in imbuing the term 
with moral judgment and his failure to change the policymaker’s political calculus.”23  Shelly’s 
department, under the Executive branch, was part of the Clinton administration. As described in 
the earlier sections of this paper, politicians are well-aware of how effective such loaded rhetoric 
can be in mobilizing the public. The Clinton administration was no different. Thus, Lemkin 
indeed succeeded in his endeavor to create a powerful word linked with moral condemnation, 
and as a result, politicians learned how to manipulate this by selectively employing it. As further 
explanation of the administration’s policy calculations and their aversion to the term, one ought 
to consider the following excerpt from the Office of the Secretary of Defense: “Be careful. Legal 
at State was worried about this yesterday—Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. 
government] to actually ‘do something’”24  
                                               
23 Power, Samantha. (361) 
24 Office of the Secretary of Defense. (1 May 1994). “Secret Discussion Paper: Rwanda”. 
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The word genocide was an important issue for a number of reasons. Firstly, its 
connection to the Holocaust should not be overlooked. UNAMIR25 Force Commander Dallaire 
reaffirms Lemkin’s success at tying the word with Hitler’s campaign of extermination: “I was 
self-conscious about saying the killings were “genocidal” because, to us in the west, “genocide” 
was the equivalent of the Holocaust… “Genocide” was the highest scale of crimes against 
humanity imaginable.”26 (Together, the cases of Daillaire and Shelly lend additional weight to 
the earlier assertion that use of the term genocide should be equated with use of the Holocaust.) 
Secondly, the question of the legal and moral imperative to act associated with the word 
genocide played a significant role. While international law did not actually demand that states 
intervene in genocide, this was a point of constant debate and uncertainty. The moral imperatives 
were clear. The important role that these three syllables played in the administration’s 
calculations is evident in the following statement from the House of Representatives Resolution 
88:  
“the Clinton Administration refused to use the word genocide with respect to the 
situation in Rwanda and on April 28, 1994, the United Nations Security Council 
deliberately omitted the word genocide from a Council resolution in order to 
avoid its legal and international obligations to intervene”27 
This, from the administration of a President who, during his candidacy, stated, “If the 
horrors of the Holocaust taught us anything, it is the high cost of remaining silent and paralyzed 
in the face of genocide.”28 What accounts for the change of heart? The lack of safety factors. 
                                               
25 United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda 
26 Power, Samantha. (358) 
27 H. Con. Res. 88 (9 March 2005). (3). 
28 Krauss, Clifford. (5 Aug 1992) “U.S. Backs Away from Charge of Atrocities in Bosnia Camps” New York Times. 
(A12) 
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Prior to the presidency, he is clearly not in the position of power in which he found himself 
during the Rwandan crisis, and thus was free to make such criticisms.  
Remarkably, Clinton’s language underwent a complete turnaround post-Rwanda. During 
his 1998 address in Kigali, President Clinton stated, “We did not immediately call these crimes 
by their rightful name: genocide.”29 He uses the term genocide nine times in this speech, not 
once attempting to eschew its applicability to Rwanda- in stark contrast to prior policy. Indeed, 
in this post-conflict environment, Clinton even makes a direct comparison to the Holocaust:  
The government-led effort to exterminate Rwanda's Tutsi and moderate Hutus, as 
you know better than me, took at least a million lives. Scholars of these sorts of 
events say that the killers, armed mostly with machete sand clubs, nonetheless did 
their work five times as fast as the mechanized gas chambers used by the Nazis. 
 
Clinton is free here to use such sensational language- stating the Rwanda genocide was even 
more intense than the Holocaust- because the conflict has come to an end. There is no longer any 
need to intervene, no danger of embroiling troops and sinking resources into a dangerous region, 
so the field is safe for such statements. As earlier, now these statements act to the benefit of the 
administration’s public relations, because they show not only remorse, but the high ground of 
acknowledging the gravity of the situation- placing it on par with a well-known reference point: 
the Holocaust.  
The Case of Kosovo 
Having explored the uses of Holocaust references and the use of the term genocide in the 
cases of Darfur and Rwanda, where the U.S. was not directly involved, one ought to test the 
“safety factor” theory in the case of Kosovo, where the U.S. did intervene, via NATO. Upon 
                                               
29 Clinton, President William. (25 March 1998) “Remarks by the President to Genocide Survivors, Assistance 
Workers, and U.S. and Rwanda Government Officials.”  
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inspection of political rhetoric, it is clear that Holocaust references were made in political 
speeches. For example, in a May 1999 address, Clinton states: 
Though this ethnic cleansing is not the same as the ethnic extermination of the 
Holocaust, the two are related – both vicious, premeditated, systematic oppression 
fueled by religious and ethnic hatred. This campaign to drive the Kosovars from 
their land and to, indeed, erase their very identity is an affront to humanity and an 
attack not only on a people, but on the dignity of all people.30 
 
The invocation of the Holocaust here exemplifies many of the structural and emotive stratagems 
discussed earlier. Unlike the instances with Rwanda and Darfur, because Clinton is actively 
involved in Kosovo, Holocaust rhetoric serves him well in garnering support. He employs not 
only the structural comparison but the emotional, moral appeals to the “dignity of all peoples”. 
By directly relating Kosovo to the atrocities sixty years earlier, he sets it up as the “next 
Holocaust”- exploring the potential for destruction and devastation, and thus augmenting the 
severity and scope of the crisis to that of the multi-national anti-Semitic campaigns of the Nazis. 
He later mentions Hitler in direct relation to Milosevic, stating: 
Political leaders do this kind of thing. You think the Germans would have 
perpetrated the Holocaust on their own without Hitler?... We've got to get straight 
about this. This is something political leaders do. And if people make decisions to 
do these kinds of things, other people can make decisions to stop them. And if the 
resources are properly arrayed it can be done. And that is exactly what we intend 
to do.31 
 
By naming Hitler, Clinton brings to the front the popular conception of evil and moral duty that a 
majority of Americans associate with him. Thus, his succeeding calls to action and affirmation of 
pro-active U.S. policy are delivered to an audience who is already prepped with feelings of a 
moral necessity to intervene, transposing the history lessons of World War II they were taught as 
                                               
30 Clinton, President William. (13 May 1999). “Remarks by the President to the Veterans of Foreign Wars on 
Kosovo.” 
31 Ibid 
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school children –images of valiant soldiers in a fight for good against evil- to the present 
situation in Kosovo.  
 Clearly, Clinton’s employing Holocaust reference reaffirms not only the relevance of 
safety factors, but the potency of Holocaust rhetoric itself. Because U.S. policy favored 
engagement in Kosovo, the safety factors are reversed: no longer wanting to downplay the 
importance of the conflict, but instead to garner support for action which Clinton himself has the 
power to initiate, employing Holocaust references becomes a strategic maneuver. Additionally, 
the use of these references attests to their potency in collecting popular support- as detailed 
earlier.  
Conclusion 
 It has been show that references to the Holocaust can be used in a number of effective 
ways. Its potency for motivating an audience, based in the popular “Holocaust consciousness” 
(as detailed in other literature), thus makes it both a tool and a danger for political officials. Use 
of Holocaust rhetoric, then, depends on the ends to which the speaker attempts to take his 
audience.  While it may be employed to manipulate audience support for intervention in 
genocide- as displayed in Clinton’s Kosovo addresses- its non-use in relevant cases implies its 
intentional avoidance – as seen in the case of Rwanda. The decision to employ Holocaust 
references in a speech rests heavily on the presence of at least one of two safety factors: the 
power to act and the responsibility for the action. In the case of most activists, journalists, 
NGO’s, and lower government officials, these safety factors are present, and thus most of the 
Holocaust rhetoric is seen in their works. Presidential and high-ranking officials, however, do not 
enjoy these safeguards, and so are less likely to use Holocaust references, or do so in a controlled 
political environment where their actions are otherwise checked or restrained.   
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